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Fit or Fitting in: Deciding Against Normal When Reproducing the
Future

ABSTRACT
‘Normal’ is a contentious term. Descriptively, ‘normal’ is a way of
representing ‘what is’ as a statistical average. The term also represents
normative or prescriptive content about what is ‘right’ or ‘what should be’.
Correspondingly, abnormality is a deviation from the norm. It is both a
factual exception to the average and a value judgment about what is a
‘wrong’ state of being. Pursuing ‘normal’ or deciding against it can be a
defining moment in the high technology environment of assisted
reproduction. In this article we explore notions of normalcy articulated
through legal and policy regimes around screening and testing of gamete
and embryo donors. To do this we draw on the work of disability scholars
and the diversity of responses to the idea of normal that were registered
by four women interviewed in studies undertaken by the authors. Three of
the interviewees had used or were intending to use donated gametes and
the fourth had intended to donate her embryos. We demonstrate how the
choice of a particular donor may reveal ingrained or structural prejudice
that reconstructs difference as disability. Equally, however, it may reveal a
multitude of ways in which difference or deviation from a normative
standard is incorporated as a normal part of family formation.

Key words: normal, abnormal, disability, donated gametes, donated
embryos, donors

Introduction
‘Normal’ is a contentious term. Descriptively, ‘normal’ is a way of representing ‘what is’
as a statistical average, however the term also represents normative or prescriptive
content about what is ‘right’ or ‘what should be’. Correspondingly, abnormality is a

deviation from the norm. It is both a factual exception to the average and a value
judgment about what is a ‘wrong’ state of being (Taylor and Mykitiuk, 2001). Pursuing
‘normal’ or deciding against it can be a defining moment in the high technology
environment of assisted reproduction. In this article we explore notions of normalcy
articulated through legal and policy regimes regarding screening and testing of gamete
and embryo donors. To do this we draw on the work of disability scholars and the
diversity of responses to the idea of normal that were registered by four women
interviewed in studies undertaken by the authors. (ARC DP 986213: Enhancing
Reproductive Opportunity 2009-2013 and ARC DP 15010157: Regulating Relations 20152018). Three of the women were interviewed because they had used, or were intending
to use, donated gametes and the fourth had intended to donate her embryos. All four
had encounters with donor selection systems and genetic testing regimes. Our research
suggests that in some cases the choice of a particular donor may reveal ingrained or
structural prejudice that reconstructs difference as abnormality. Equally, however, it
may reveal a multitude of ways in which difference or deviation from a normative
standard is incorporated as a normal part of family formation.

Screening and testing protocols for donated gametes
ART clinic testing and screening protocols for donors exist to ensure they and/or their
gametes are unaffected by genetic anomaly, infectious disease or psychological illness
and are often more rigorous than for people who reproduce with ART using their own
gametes. These guidelines and practices reflect a conception of what, in the clinical
context, is considered to be ‘normal’ in both the descriptive and prescriptive sense,
while at the same time, arguably, prescribing more than the usual indicators for what is
traditionally understood as good health. Nevertheless, screening and testing practices
vary quite markedly across clinics and jurisdictions suggesting that there is no clear
consensus about what constitutes a ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ donor or donated gamete.
Australian clinics have both a domestic and imported supply of gametes for
reproductive use and must comply with the Australian Reproductive Technology
Accreditation Committee Code of Practice, the National Health and Medical Research
Council guidelines on Assisted Reproduction and State based legislation. Apart from
standard disease transmission controls there are no specific requirements regarding
testing or screening though most clinics have extensive screening and testing regimes.
IVF Australia, for instance, tests sperm donors’ chromosomes and for genetic conditions
such as cystic fibrosis, sickle cell disease, and other conditions depending on ethnic
background (http://www.ivf.com.au/fertility-treatment/donor-program/require-asperm-donor). In the United States, the UK, and Europe a range of protocols and
regulations operate for donated gametes. In Europe, for instance, under the European
Union Directive on Human Tissues and Cells, ‘gamete donors should be screened
(tested) “for autosomal recessive genes known to be prevalent (…) in the donor’s ethnic
background”’ (Dondorp et al. 2014, 2; Commission Directive 2006). In the US, screening
and testing for certain autosomal conditions is recommended by the American Society
for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) regardless of ethnicity for the entire population,

including carrier testing for Spinal Muscular Atrophy (Prior 2008 cited in Dondorp et al
2014, 1355) and Cystic Fibrosis (ACOG 2011). While, the ASRM do not require
karyotyping for chromosomal translocations, the French Centre d’Etude et de
Conservation des Oeufs et du Sperme Humains and British guidelines of the Association
of Biomedical Andrologists (Dondorp et al. 2014) recommend it. In comparison, in
Germany and the Netherlands there is an active recommendation against karyotyping
(Dondorp et al. 2014). Finally, some protocols go so far as to recommend against using a
donor who tests positive as a carrier for a heterozygous autosomal recessive disorder
(requiring two copies of the gene for the disorder to materialize) (Dondorp et al. 2014).
This is despite the fact that, as Sara Wienke et al., report, ‘[i]t is estimated that each
individual is a carrier of between zero and seven severe childhood recessive conditions
with an average of 2.8 found in one study’ (2014, 191). This has led McGowan, Cho, and
Sharp to suggest that ‘identification as a carrier [is] the new normal’ (2013, 9).
From this brief summary it is apparent that there is no consensus about testing/
screening protocols for donated gametes. Rather, they reflect a range of views about
what constitutes a ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ gamete. In the United States, where there is a
commercial market for gametes, preconception screening and testing of donors is
comprehensive. The World Egg Bank for instance, advertises next generation massive
sequencing (NGS) which they describe as ‘a powerful new technology that can examine
the entire genetic code of a female donor, and predict how her DNA, or genetic code, will
interact with the genetic information of the male partner before conception.’
(http://www.theworldeggbank.com/next-generation-testing/). Testing is not limited to
genetic analysis, but often includes comprehensive psychological testing alongside
analysis of the medical history of the donor’s immediate family (parents, grandparents
and siblings) including any familial experience of conditions such as depression, mood
swings, anxiety, and more. Though not required by any professional guidelines, a
number of US IVF clinics use personality tests when screening potential donors. One
clinic, the New York University Fertility Centre, has undertaken a study of its own
practices using what they called ‘enhanced genetic and psychological testing,’ and
reported excluding 31 percent of potential donors based on genetic and psychological
factors. The report states: ‘Enhanced genetic screening with universal testing for TaySachs, Fragile X and karyotype excluded 25 candidates’ (Reh et al. 2010, 2300). However
it goes on to say ‘….those excluded for a personal or family medical history had histories
suggestive of an unacceptable transmissible genetic trait such as dyslexia, early cardiac
disease and aggressive cancers’ (2300). These potential candidates were not identified
(and excluded) by genetic testing but based on family histories. Further, exclusions
occurred based on what was described as ‘basic psychological screening.’ Reh notes that
‘depression was the most common factor for exclusion and alcoholism was the most
common factor identified in family history of psychological disorder’ (2300). But people
were also excluded for attention deficit disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, family
history of schizophrenia, suicide, bipolar disorder and other conditions (2302).
Enhanced psychological testing where even more candidates were excluded for
‘unfavourable behaviour’ followed this including for: dishonesty, non-compliance,
immaturity, criminal history, hostility toward staff and refusal to disclose donation to
spouse.

The testing and screening practices described above suggest an acceptance of the
heritability of not only single gene conditions but of complex psychological conditions
and socially undesirable personal characteristics as well as those regarded to be
desirable. Daniels and Heidt-Forsythe equate this geneticization with a modern eugenics
movement and state: ‘The belief that idealized (and often nonbiological) human traits
are transmitted genetically is one historical characteristic of the eugenics movement
and….[w]e argue that sperm and egg donation practices in the American reproductive
industry mirror positive eugenic beliefs in new and more subtle forms’ (Daniels and
Heidt-Forsythe 2012, 720). However, if these screening and testing processes are in lock
step with an ideology of improvement it is by no means clear, as our research
demonstrates below, that the people who access them have a shared understanding of
what is ‘better’ or indeed what is ‘normal’.

Diverse normality and normal disability
In The End of Normal, Lennard Davis describes ‘diversity’ as the new normal but as a
constrained concept (Davis 2013) under conditions of neoliberalism. As a neoliberal
concept, Davis argues, diversity is shaped by a commitment to the self-authorizing
individual and ‘implies celebration, choice’(8) and malleability (5). However, disabled
bodies are conventionally imagined as ‘fixed’ (6, 7), in need of fixing and an identity that
is not chosen (by oneself or others) (11, 14). Thus, for Davis, the neo-liberal diverse
subject, cannot incorporate disability. This caveat is an important corrective to an
uncritical embrace of the concept of diversity among those who might otherwise see it
as a means to achieve radical inclusion. Davis states ‘the concept of diversity, currently
is rendered operative largely by excluding groups that might be thought of as abject or
hypermarginalised’ (4). Disability, therefore, ‘reveals the state of exception’ in the
neoliberal diversity paradigm, ‘by being continuously connected with the exception to
the norm.’(9). Thus, Davis’ contention is that the very difference of disability – its
abjectness, immutability and unchoseness - is the necessary category of the not normal
against which a self-chosen and malleable diversity can be inscribed as normative (14).
We suggest, and our research demonstrates below, that within the context of ART,
where a neoliberal consumerist model increasingly proliferates, diversity nevertheless
has a more expansive meaning than that suggested by Davis. We have found that some
users of ART re/construct disability within a more capacious and diverse understanding
of normalcy – what we might call diverse normality. Indeed, for some users of ART, a
neo-liberal construction of diversity is neither accepted nor desired.
The idea that disability can be regarded as ‘a new normal’ has been proposed by
Ginsburg and Rapp (2016). On their account, the increased growth of the (American)
population with disabilities and its projected rise in the future, signals an opportunity
for ‘a refiguring of notions of typicality that we think of as “a new normal” in which the
inclusion of disability is no longer considered exceptional but is simply taken for
granted….’ (2016). Integral to this shift to a ‘new normal’ are the requisite
accommodations of disability together with accessible and inclusive futures in which

persons with a panoply of disabilities are accommodated as full participants.
As we highlight below, in the context of utilizing donated gametes and embryos, users of
ART not only display an expansive understanding of what constitutes disability and
what we are terming diverse normality, but in some instances do appear to choose
disability or, at least, to place it on a continuum of normalcy. One of the distinct features
of our study is the significance of the contingent and changing context of kin-making
within which users of donor gametes are confronting issues of disability and normalcy.
The use of genetic testing/screening are practices which typically reinforce and apply a
biomedical model of disability in a context of desired family formation using donated
gametes. However, these donor gamete practices, protocols, and regulations ignore the
contingency of the process of kin-making. Payne notes for instance that the provision of
a list of donors to choose from for people undertaking ART appears to ‘reinforce the idea
that one can choose, and that choosing is unconnected to other social constraints and
norms’ (2015, 113). But she goes on to say that in her study:
while the choice of donor is clearly articulated within a larger discourse of
consumer choice also amongst the patients, it does not follow that the
patients internalize this discourse in an unequivocal manner. On the
contrary, the interviewees have tended either to downplay the process of
choosing, stressing to me how “strange” the process of choosing had been or
in other ways signalling that they did not regard this process as completely
unproblematic (113).

Along similar lines, in a Belgian study, though donor sperm recipients indicated, that
familial coherence would be achieved by matching donors with traits that were the
same as their own or their partner’s personality traits (Raveligian et al. 2014, 9) they
also indicated a preference for a donor with whom they had a rapport ‘comparable to
what you experience when you make a new friend or fall in love with someone’ (9). So
while users of donated gametes/embryos may initially strive to create sameness or
relationships of similarity between themselves and their future progeny when choosing
donors, or to eliminate risks of non-normative traits, these desires inevitably bump up
against contingent and changing contexts as they engage in their reproductive project of
building their families and creating kinship relations. For example, the number of
gametes and embryos are limited as are the financial resources to generate additional
ones, while in some cases affective relationships between donors and donees become
established that displace the importance of sameness or certain traits. Therefore, the
contingency of forming kinship is fluid, diverse and complex unlike the fixity and
certainty imagined in testing/screening regulations and policies, and this includes the
way that disability is received. In their act of forming kinship relationships, often
through constrained choices regarding gametes and gamete donors, ART users
frequently have to, or choose to, discard biomedical models of disability and employ
complex, social, embodied, relational concepts of disability and difference transforming

disability into a new normal or into something along a continuum of normalcy. Context
and contingency are everything in this world of kin-making. As Nordqvist suggests:
The meaning of genes, similarity… characteristics, aptitudes, physicality …
feelings …practices, time, fairness and resemblances [and we would add
disability] can be renegotiated, revisited and even transformed, and yet still
all be used to signal connectedness. Thereby, we can emphasise the
importance of some relations whilst discounting others in a way that fits the
family we live with and also cope with an unpredictable future (280).
This is in contrast to the knowable future as misleadingly assured by prenatal genetic
testing/screening.

Choosing fitness or fitting in
Despite a proliferation of policy and screening guidelines from clinics, medical
professional organisations and regulatory bodies, the four women interviewed in our
studies (see below) fashioned their own ideas of what is normal and acceptable, of what
kinds of differences make up the categories of disability and diverse normality. What is
normal became an idiosyncratic function of an array of factors including: personal
desire, emotional connection, qualities of the embryo that are imagined to have a
bearing on the future child, gender preference and a variety of embodied characteristics.
Normalcy was crafted as a form of relational fitting in to the partially established and
imagined future contours of the life or lives of those seeking to procreate.

This decision-making on the part of donor recipients suggests that the views of
disability scholars Rosemary Garland-Thomson and Dan Goodley may find some support
among our study participants. Both theorists posit normalcy as a potentially ableist
concept and argue, instead, for the positive identification of multiple and varying ways
of being. Goodley reminds us that ‘a whole host of norms … are, in actuality, limiting and
stifling’. Moreover he recognizes the possibility for non-normative ‘exciting, radicalizing
and alternative practices of everyday life in counterpoint to the idealized normal citizen
of our times’ (Goodley 2014, 158). Garland-Thomson, utilizes the concept of ‘misfit’
which she says ‘emphasizes the particularity of varying lived embodiments and avoids a
theoretical generic disabled body that can dematerialize if social and architectural
barriers no longer disable it’ (Garland-Thomson, 2011, 592). For Garland-Thomson,
disability is not just about functional impairment but rather includes difference that
simply does not fit in socially, culturally and materially. She goes on to say:
When we fit harmoniously and properly into the world, we forget the truth
of contingency because the world sustains us. When we experience

misfitting and recognise that disjuncture for its political potential, we
expose the relational component and the fragility of fitting. Any of us can fit
here today and misfit there tomorrow. (597)

This idea of fit as relational insists on the way that normal/cy exists in the interstices of
our agreements about what constitutes it as such. It has no objective status outside of
our embodied relations with each other and the institutional and environmental
contexts within which we are situated. Misfitting too then is relational. It is not that an
individual is inherently ‘abnormal’ but rather that in a network of relations within a
social and material context he or she is out of sync or excluded. The concepts of
misfitting and fitting require us, as Garland-Thomson states, to ‘recognise that bodies
are always situated in and dependent upon environments through which they
materialise as fitting and misfitting’ (598).

In the context of ART use and choosing donor gametes for the purpose of reproduction,
applying the concept of mis/fitting illustrates the contingent, relational and situated
character of normalcy that operates in the enterprise of kin making. The misfit is not a
particular body (or mind), but the mutually constitutive relationship between a body in
its temporal, social and material place – one whose embodiment is out of sync with
dominant narratives or norms. Those who use donor gametes and embryos themselves
already operate outside of the norm. Reproducing with the use of donor gametes, their
practice of technological conception as well as their frequent deviation from the creation
of the hetero-normative family marks many ART users as misfits. For others, living with
embodied difference marked by society as disability, fuels the desire for progeny
created from donor gametes that will better fit in an ableist world. Yet, choosing gamete
donors, like choosing kin, is complex. As we illustrate below, a gamete donor may be fit,
not because of the anticipated genetic qualities he or she will bestow, but because they
fit in with the donor recipient’s sense of family. Normalcy, in relation to the choice of
donor gametes therefore, is sometimes revealed to be a function not of fitness but of
fitting in.

Choosing against, between and within normal
In this section we offer a carefully selected sample of original data from our ongoing and
recent research on assisted reproduction. i We focus on four participants whose unique
set of circumstances have required them to make decisions about testing and screening
when reproducing with donor gametes or donating embryos that may have a genetic or
chromosomal anomaly. We have chosen these four because they demonstrate a range of
responses to the idea of normalcy, the subject of this article. Using a semi-structured
interview format, participants were asked to reflect upon why they chose to use donor

gametes or to donate embryos.
The examples we draw on demonstrate how the choices made by our participants
trouble assumptions about the meaning of and desire for normalcy in relation to one’s
future child. Where participants were required to make a decision about disability, our
case studies uncover how those decisions are taken both within, and in resistance to, the
regime of normalcy prescribed by testing protocols. As our analysis reveals, the process
of decision making about the use of donor gametes, for example, suggests a highly
textured, contextualized and relational approach. This stands in stark juxtaposition to
the apparent normalizing of the decision making process and the standards it is
expected that donor recipients follow in making reproductive decisions as
demonstrated by the range of testing/screening guidelines, policies and clinic practices.
The act of kin making, as the participant interviews we discuss below demonstrate,
seem to displace or elide the assumptions about normalcy that are embedded in policy
and screening guideline documents. These guidelines are based on a rationalist model
that cannot or will not contemplate affect and contingency. In our research however, we
see various users fashion their own ideas of normalcy out of the circumstances with
which they are confronted, including information about the actual gametes and embryos
before them. ‘Normal’ becomes contingent on what the technology produces – the
number, sex, quality of the embryos in relation to the desires and experiences of those
using the technologies and the possibly constrained options they have, given their desire
to have a baby. Indeed, Nordqvist, in a study of lesbian parenthood using donor
conception, suggests that contingency in family creation should be understood as
contributing to the construction of kinship. She notes that:
[i]t is important to emphasise that… couples experienced a process which
was in part shaped by their desires and wishes, and in part by issues beyond
their control. As a result, their routes, wishes and options changed with
circumstance and with the way their lives and conception journey ‘worked
out.’ This in turn shaped the way in which they perceived and engaged in the
process of bringing kinship into existence. Imagining kinship and the future
family was a question revisited again and again with every new avenue
explored. (Nordqvist 2013, 271)
While Nordqvist’s research does not examine donated gamete users’ choices about
disability in shaping kinship, it is clear from our research (described below) that a
similar process of contingency occurs when gamete users confront decisions of possible
or likely difference or disability. Moreover, we found that coming up against the
contingency of difference does not always result in the rejection of disability but instead
can result in a recalibration of what is normal and what might be considered normal
kinship. Our case studies demonstrate what happens when the appearance of choice
knocks up against the reality of contingency and how this affects the very
conceptualisation of normalcy. Some of our interviewees actively decided against
assumed understandings of ‘normal’ while others found themselves choosing between

different kinds of ‘normal’. Their choices gestured towards the possibility of resisting
normative/neoliberal expectations and contributing to the realization of non-normative
or diverse normative future possibilities.
Consider Dian,ii who revealed that when choosing an egg donor she went through a
complex process that incorporated the donor into the love relationship with her partner.
Dian told us:
We spoke to three egg donors. We fell in love with one of them. Then they're
about to sign the contract and we realised that this particular donor
apparently has - is a Tay-Sachs carrier. Apparently, that can be quite a fatal
situation if both - if William [Dian’s husband] was also a carrier. I mean it
would be fatal. So at that point we cancelled with this particular donor that
we'd fallen in love with, and we went on a major search on egg donors. iii So I
ended up speaking to about seven egg donors over Skype. Then we didn't
find anyone. It's like The Princess and the Pea. Was it The Princess and the
Pea? There's a fairy tale like that.
We looked and looked, and there was no-one even close to this particular
donor that we really, really fell in love with. William, one day, said ‘look, why
don't we just consider her again?’ So we did, and when we came back we
called our agents - the egg donor agency - and said we'd like to go ahead
with...
Interviewer:
Dian:

Because you felt so attached to her?

Yeah, yeah.

Interviewer:

So then how did you handle the Tay-Sachs? Did you get

William tested?
Dian:

Yeah, William was tested. We just thought, well, we don't fall in love

with people based on them being perfect, so I guess it - from that point of
view. As a result, here she is [the baby].

The language of love and its association with imperfection is interesting because it
returns the clinical and contractual context of the use of ART to the motivation for the
kinds of choices that are being made in relation to family formation. Here, Dian

expresses an incapacity for satisfaction in relation to other potential donors in the
context of love—expressed through the fairy tale of The Princess and the Pea—a tale
which is both about proving the authenticity of Princesshood (here standing in for
motherhood) and the appropriate object of love for the Prince. In our case however, it is
the authenticity of the donor as the appropriate object of love for Dian and William, the
intending parents, that is established.iv. Dian makes the egg donor the recipient of love
and as such normalises her genetic status – ‘we don’t fall in love with people based on
them being perfect’. In this sense Dian is prepared to accept the donor’s carrier status
even though it may be passed on to the future child.v The development of this love
relationship stands in contrast to the moral framework that typically animates
bioethicists. They argue that there is a
morally relevant difference between donor conception and reproduction
between partners. Partners want to reproduce together, whereas people
needing donor gametes do not (in most cases) want to reproduce only with
this donor. And whereas partners cannot be replaced, donors, as providers
of gametes are replaceable. (Dondorp et al. 2014, 4)
In Dian’s case the fungibility of donors was absent because of the way she constructed
her relationship to the donor inside the love relationship that originally motivated
reproduction in the first place. For Goodley, desire ‘is a force through which we connect
with one another’ (165) and disability studies invites us to rethink how and what we
desire as we use technological means to create new forms of kin and relationality. Dian’s
experience with her donor exemplifies the possibility of desiring new non-normative
becomings and belongings.

In a second example, Olivia, who initially attempted to use her own eggs but was
unsuccessful, was the recipient of both donor oocytes and sperm. Olivia decided to use
sex selection because she did not want to have a boy and risk the possibility of having an
autistic child.vi Olivia’s brother had two sons she described as “borderline autistic but
highly ADHD”. Olivia sought out an American clinic where she could have genetic testing.
By day six when Olivia attended the clinic for the transfer she had six healthy male
embryos, one female embryo that tested positive for trisomy 21 (Down syndrome) and
four embryos of unknown sex that had been sent for testing without results. Keen to
have a girl, she chose not to have one of the six known ‘healthy’ male embryos
transferred but rather to have two of the untested embryos transferred. She did not
contemplate transferring the only identified female embryo which she described as
‘abnormal’. She went on:
Olivia: Yes, and so I elected to have transfer of two of the four unknown sex
embryos.
Interviewer:

Oh okay….

Olivia: Yeah, because they explained to me that if they were abnormal they
would not likely work and there was, obviously in my mind there was a
higher chance that one of the embryos - because I had two transferred - that
one of them or two of them maybe might be female, versus knowing that the
other ones are all male. So I received the results the following day and it
turned out that the two that they transferred were both healthy male
embryos [laughs] and the other two that they didn't transfer were
abnormal.
…
So at that point I spent the following two weeks coming to terms with it
and decided that I really wanted a healthy baby more than I wanted a
daughter and that having a family is more important to me than anything.

As noted above these kinds of choices and decisions are made in embedded and
contingent contexts. In Olivia’s case her relationship to her brother and his children had
initially driven her quest for a girl. But, her desire for a girl, once established as a choice
she might make, appears to have cemented as separate from any disability avoidance
strategy. Once, however, that choice bumps up against the contingency and context of
her own reproductive options she reframes her desire and normalizes her
disappointment. This is evidenced in her interview when Olivia speaks about reading
internet forums on ‘gender disappointment’. She says:
There's actually a lot of information about gender disappointment online
and so I've read a lot of people's stories and realised that it is unrealistic to
expect that you can get what you want all of the time [laughs].
Much later on she says:
It just emotionally helps you to deal with it all the way through because
you're able to then say okay, well there was a girl but it wasn't a healthy
embryo.

Goodley argues that ‘[t]he normal category exists not as a simple fixed position
of humanity but as a register, a subject position, a preferred way of living life and a
phenomenon of ableist cultures’ (118). Thus while this example might seem more
appropriately placed in an article discussing the ethics of gender selection we have
included it here because as Goodley notes ‘normals’ are each marked by differences
associated with gender, class, sexuality, age and ethnicity (118). Therefore though we
might accept that ‘[b]eing normal is one of society’s preferred ontological states and
moral categories,’(118) we argue that the category of normal is a shifting and flexible
signifier. Olivia’s imagining of gender disappointment then substantiates Goodley’s point
that neither normalcy nor disability are simply about having an embodied difference but
are inflected by social and cultural readings of difference including how they are
gendered.

In contrast to Olivia, Cybil, an interviewee who diagnosed herself with
Aspergers, and believes her son born through traditional surrogacy [where the
surrogate is also the egg donor] has autism spectrum disorder made it clear that the
possibility of ASD from her egg donor was not something that raised concerns. Asked
about the kinds of information she received about the medical history of her donor she
replies:

Cybil: I think family history of cancer and heart disease, stroke, diabetes
and whatever, but either positive or negative. Emmeline [the egg donor and
surrogate] disclosed that she had ADHD and there was a history of autism in
her family, which we are now seeing probably in Louie.[Cybil’s son] He's
getting ready to do his ASD assessment.
Interviewer:

Okay, so is that Autism Spectrum Disorder?

Cybil: Yeah.
…
Interviewer:
unlikely?

Okay …it sounds like it was an expectation that it was not

Cybil: Yeah, it was not unlikely and it was a risk we took, so okay, well he
could have a chance of having anything. Probably the thing that I was most
apprehensive about was if it had a genetic disorder that was compatible
with life such as Down syndrome or anything else, … It's hard to know really
at the end of the day, but we were pretty convinced that we really didn't
want to have a special needs child, because we didn't have any energy left
after the end of the whole process that we'd gone through.

Referring to the surrogate, Cybil indicates that she would not have agreed to an abortion
and says: ‘so we had to roll that dice and it was very nerve-wracking. It was like well, we
either choose to take this risk or we don't become parents’. Asked whether she viewed
this decision as hard Cybil replies: ‘It was just one after the other of massive
compromise and letting your values go so that you could get to the end of the journey’.
Again we see a clear sense in which desires bump up against contingency and normalcy
is reformulated accordingly. Indeed, we see an interesting disconnect between
contemporary medical approaches to disability and that of the intending parent.
Whereas clinics view their role as limiting the risk of disability, the intending parent
appears prepared ‘to roll the dice’ and deal with contingency.
In this case Cybil viewed ASD as a risk to be taken compared with Down syndrome. This
bears out our argument that ideas of normalcy are shifting and flexible and circulate
around familial fitting in.. Rather than trying to achieve a child with no disabilities or
genetic conditions recipients are interested in family coherence and appear to
determine normalcy relationally. In Cybil’s case Autism didn’t challenge that coherence
but Down syndrome did.

This notion is also borne out in the experience of Scarlet (a donor, rather than a donor
recipient).vii She was denied the ability to donate her embryos because they were
determined to be genetically affected. Scarlet’s genetic condition had a 100 percent
transmission rate, but she had identified potential recipients for her embryos who were
aware of her genetic condition and wished to receive the embryos notwithstanding. The
clinic however, refused to facilitate the transfer on the basis that it was not in the best
interests of the resulting children. Scarlet then put her case (unsuccessfully) before the
ethics committee of her clinic. In her interview she remarked on how confronting it was
to be told what amounted to the view that it was not in the best interests of her own
children who bore the same condition and were conceived at the same time as the
embryos she was seeking to donate, to be born. She said:
my children are immensely loved and showered with everything they need
and they're well built up, well cared for and it's hard to say that it was not in
their best interests to even exist.

Scarlet’s experience, and that of the potential recipients who wanted to transfer her
donated embryos, illustrate starkly Davis’s argument that disability occupies the ‘state
of exception’(8) in a regime of normalcy, here enforced by an infertility industry and
bioethics regime. But where Davis argues that in conditions of normality construed as
diversity, disability falls outside choice (14) and is not chooseable (11), the story of
Scarlet suggests otherwise, at least from the point of view of prospective users of ART
and recipients of donor gametes and embryos. While Scarlet’s aim of donating has been
thwarted by ableist policies and practices, by a misfit between the social and cultural
devaluation of those who share Scarlet’s characteristics and their reproductive
aspirations, her expressed desire and that of her potential donor recipients to reproduce
that which others regard as unfit to come into being, indicate an active embracing of
disability – what we would call diverse normalcy from the point of view of Scarlet and
her potential recipients. But what this example makes urgently apparent as well, is that
being able to choose against idealized normalcy and embrace diverse normalcy in the
creation of one’s family, to give material effect to one’s choices, is unsurprisingly,
contingent and thoroughly political – like the concept of normalcy itself.

Conclusion: who decides who fits?

The idea of the ‘normal,’ as we have stated in this article, is both a descriptive and
prescriptive concept. The prescriptive element in particular is contingent on scientific
data coupled with social and cultural explanations to define its content. It follows that
the normal is also understood as one side of an oppositional binary, in contrast to the
‘abnormal’ or disability (Goodley 2014) or, as Davis would state, disability is the
exception to the norm of diversity. Thus, normalcy and abnormalcy/disability exist in a
relationship of co-constitution. This is not to suggest a permanence to their respective
content, but to propose that constructions of normalcy are generally thought to exist
against that which an (inferior) Other (disabled/abnormal) is conceptualized. (Goodley
2014, 88).

While agreeing with much of this understanding of normalcy and its relationship to
abnormalcy and disability, in this article we have offered a more textured and contextual
account building on the specific perspectives of interview subjects engaged in choosing
gametes or embryos for reproductive purposes. Employing the concept of diverse
normality we demonstrate how, in the constrained and contingent context of selecting
gamete and embryo donors, some recipients deploy an expansive conception of
normalcy, making a reproductive choice that would not otherwise have been
contemplated. Moreover, as we have argued, in the context of choosing donor gametes
or embryos for purposes of ART, what is normal for some recipients may rely less on

assumptions about what it is to be healthy or fit and indeed more on what it means to ‘fit
in’. Yet for others, the contours of diverse normalcy include an active embracing of
disability, apparently breaking down the binary altogether. Garland-Thomson states
that ‘to fit and be fit, … is to be ensconced in an environment that sustains the particular
form, function and needs of one’s body’. (600) It is clear from our research that for some
people fitting in - being normal – is enhanced or delimited not by difference or deviation
from some external standard of what is good and right but by love and desire and a
matrix of relationships.

Notes
i

The larger project is with Professors Millbank, Stuhmcke and Jackson (ARC DP
15010157: Regulating Relations). We refer briefly to earlier research Karpin
conducted with Professors Millbank and Stuhmcke (DP ARC DP 986213: Enhancing
Reproductive Opportunity). Ethics approval was granted by the University of
Technology Human Research Ethics Committee for both projects.

ii

All interviews use pseudonyms to preserve anonymity and confidentiality.

iii

It is worth noting here that the decision to find an unaffected donor is based on the
view that donors, unlike intimate partners are fungible and therefore even carrier
status is to be avoided. See Dondorp 2014.
Notably Dian knows the donor only through her communications with her on Yahoo

iv

and there are no names exchanged. She is both unknown and known and yet the
relationship is characterised in terms of love.
v

While William’s test for Tay Sachs is negative, there is still a 25 percent possibility that
Dian and William’s child will be a carrier of Tay Sachs because the egg donor was a
Tay Sachs carrier and the condition is autosomal recessive.

vi

It should be noted that there is strong disagreement among the scientific community
regarding the association of ASD and maleness. See Karpin, I. 2015.

vii

Scarlet was participant interviewed for the Enhancing Reproductive Opportunity
study that preceded the study in which our other case studies were interviewed.
Further details of the earlier research can be found in a special issue of the Journal
of Law and Medicine Volume 20(4). See specifically Millbank, Jenni. et al. 2013. See
also Millbank, Jenni (forthcoming).
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